UST 10y at 5.04% and gilt 10y at 5.49% — both the highest since 2007/08 — do not threaten Assured Guaranty's capacity to pay. The stress transmits through rating migration into the BIG (below-investment-grade) bucket and through individual restructurings costing tens to low-hundreds of millions each: a rating-agency capital-ratio story wearing a claims-story costume.
Computed live from the Stress Lab engine — the same model that powers the interactive page, so these numbers cannot drift from it. Ultimate loss converts to present value as scheduled debt service (non-accelerated), taxed at 21%, and absorbed into adjusted book value. The share price reference is $70.35 (Sept 2026).
| Scenario | Ultimate loss | PV loss | Stressed ABV / share | vs $70.35 | CPR coverage |
|---|
Analytical scenarios, not forecasts, price targets, or rating-agency results. S&P definitions: AA severe = GDP −15%, unemployment 20% · AAA extreme = Great Depression rerun. Open the Stress Lab to change every assumption yourself.
A $9B loss doesn't arrive in a normal world — what the extreme scenario implies for everything else, and what the company can do about it.
Headline figures from the Q3 2026 results release and 3Q26 Financial Supplement (September 30, 2026); CUSIP tape, par and ratings detail per the 2Q26 Financial Supplement unless noted.
– named credits reviewed line by line. Traffic lights are reviewer judgment, not agency ratings.
| Bucket | Size | What it means |
|---|---|---|
| (a) Expected claims | ~$113M | Net expected loss to be paid. Bounded — and rising rates mechanically shrink its present value. |
| (b) BIG migration | $8.02B (2.9%) | The real transmission channel. Event-driven (Thames, Brightline, Spanish solar), not model-driven. BIG-2 jumped $3.81B → $4.93B in six months. |
| (c) Portfolio marks | AOCI –$466M | Pure GAAP optics (~$375M per 100bp) — not earnings, not statutory capital. |
| (d) Capital | $10B CPR | 45:1 financial resources ratio. Even a $500M all-in Brightline loss ≈ 5% of claims-paying resources. |
| Name | Par | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Brightline Trains Florida | $1.1B (BIG 2) | ≥$350M restructuring-support agreement (Aug 2026, not yet effective); no filing as of Sept 20, 2026 |
| Thames Water | $2,365M (B) | RP2 proposes ~25% Class A writedown vs. special-administration risk; £3bn super-senior primes Class A |
| South East Water | $712M (BBB–) | Cut to junk at two agencies in 2026 (filing rating stale) |
| Sacramento City USD | $837M (BBB–) | Fitch BB– (Apr 2026) — genuine surprise blow-up |
| Palomar Health | $374M CCC BIG slice ($637M B– total) | Covenant breaches; forbearance endpoint unverified |
| Jackson MS Water & Sewer | $140M (BB) | Federal receivership; paid via court-ordered rate hike |
Par and internal ratings per the 2Q26 Financial Supplement (June 30, 2026).
The bull offset: H1 2026 PVP was $152M, +48% — US public-finance PVP alone beat all of H1 2025. The same 5% rates stressing Thames and Brightline are why issuers pay up for wraps.